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Applying Strict Liability to Professionals:
Economic and Legal Analysis
FRANK J. VANDALL*T
I. INTRODUCTION
While the application of strict liability to injuries involving products has
been expanding over the past few years,' no court has held that strict liability
controls in a case involving a professional. 2 The policies underlying strict liabil-
* Professor of Law, Emory University; Washington and Jefferson College, B.A., 1964;
Vanderbilt University, J.D., 1967; University of Wisconsin, LL.M., 1968, S.J.D., 1979.
I appreciate the contributions of my research assistant Marianne Bradley.
t Copyright 1984 by Frank J. Vandall. All rights reserved.
1. See Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CuM.
L. REv. 293 (1979); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1961); Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
2. See supra notes 188-248 and accompanying text.
The application of strict liability to professionals was selected for analysis because this issue
is at the center of contemporary tort theory and is of substantial importance to claimants and
professionals. Strict liability has been applied to sellers, manufacturers, lessors, and to sales/serv-
ice hybrids, but it has not yet been applied to a pure service. The topic of this Article is a merger
of two complex and important concepts in tort law: the strict liability cause of action and the
scope of liability.
This Article will deal with a segment of the pure service classification, where no product
is involved or the product is of secondary importance to the service. Professionals are unique
because society and the courts have accorded them recognition and protection. But see DeBakey
v. Staggs, 605 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) where the court held that the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act applied to services provided by an attorney. The failure of the defendant attorney
to effectuate a name change was held to be "grossly unfair" and "unconscionable."
Several definitions of a profession have been offered. For example, Wasserstrom has iden-
tified the following as the central features of a profession:
(1) The professions require a substantial period of formal education-at least as
much if not more than that required by any other occupation.
(2) The professions require the comprehension of a substantial amount of
theoretical knowledge and the utilization of a substantial amount of intellectual
ability. Neither manual nor creative ability is typically demanded. This is one thing
that distinguishes the professions both from highly skilled crafts-like glassblowing-
and from the arts.
(3) The professions are both an economic monopoly and largely self-regulating.
Not only is the practice of the profession restricted to those who are certified as
possessing the requisite competencies,'but the questions of what competencies are
required and who possesses them are questions that are left to the members of
the profession to decide for themselves.
(4) The professions are clearly among the occupations that possess the greatest
social prestige in the society. They also typically provide a degree of material af-
fluence substantially greater than that enjoyed by most working persons.
(5) The professions are almost always involved with matters which from time
to time are among the greatest personal concerns that humans have: physical health,
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
ity support applying the action to professionals, however. 3 The purpose of
psychic well-being, liberty, and the like. As a result, persons who seek the services
of a professional are often in a state of appreciable concern, if not vulnerability,
when they do so.
(6) The professions almost always involve at their core a significant interper-
sonal relationship between the professional, on the one hand, and the person who
is thought to require the professional's services; the patient or the client.
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 1977 NATIONAL CONF. ON TEACHING
PROF. R SP. 105. Pound defines a profession as follows:
A profession is group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the
spirit of public service-no less a public service because incidentally it may be a
means of livelihood. The exigencies of the economic order require most persons
to gain a livelihood and the gaining of a livelihood is a purpose to which they
are constrained to devote their activities. But while in all walks of life men must
bear this in mind, in business and trade it is the primary purpose. In a profession,
on the other hand, it is an incidental purpose, pursuit of which is held down by
traditions of a chief purpose to which the organized activities of those pursuing
the calling are to be directed primarily and by which the individual activities of
the practitioner are to be restrained and guided.
R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE VOL. V. 676 (1959). As will be seen in Section III, these definitions
are merely descriptive and are not helpful in deciding whether to apply strict liability to a
professional.
3. Professor Greenfield stated:
The reasons commonly given for ... applying strict liability in tort to transactions
in goods also apply to service transactions. Foremost among those reasons are the
public interest in the protection of human life, health, and safety; the seller's superior
knowledge and opportunity to determine if the goods are defective; the consumer's
reliance on the skill, care, and reputation of the seller; the superior ability of the
seller to bear the loss caused by defects and to distribute the risk of that loss over
all his customers; and the wasteful circuity of action when the consumer is permit-
ted to assert claims in negligence only against those with thom he is in privity.
Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liabil-
ity in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 661, 688.
Similarly, Professor Franklin, in discussing the application of strict liability to doctors for
hepatitis, argued:
The safety incentive rational is compelling, however, since physicians are usually
seeking profit in a competitive context. Imposing hepatitis costs on surgeons would
emphasize the risks of blood transfusions, and the surgeons could respond by pressur-
ing local hospitals to alter their source of blood or pressuring the blood banks
to provide improved service. This latter approach would be particularly effective,
since several are run by local medical societies. . . . Finally, the loss-spreading
justification applies to physicians since they are well aware of the risks involved
and are able to insure against them. The risk of hepatitis would probably not raise
the premiums for malpractice insurance appreciably, and the physician could pass
these additional costs on to his patients through higher fees.
Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REv. 439, 472
(1972).
A student note analyzed whether the "least cost avoider test" for strict liability should be
applied to doctors:
Calabresi and Hirschoff propose that strict liability for accidents be imposed on
whichever "of the parties to the accident is in the best possible position to make
the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and
to act on that decision once it is made . ...
• . . [A]pplication of the test to the medical maloccurrence field suggests that
the physicians should be strictly liable. Presumably health care providers, as a
category, have more information or better access to information than their patients
and are therefore in a better position to perform the cost-benefit analysis as to
[Vol. 59:25
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
this Article is to examine, from both economic (Section II) and legal (Section
III) perspectives, whether strict liability should apply to professionals. An ad-
ditional purpose is to analyze the relationship among strict liability, contract,
and no-fault.
Section II suggests that strict liability should be applied to physicians.
Medical doctors were selected for study because of the complexity of the sub-
ject matter, the availability of appellate cases, and the continuing failure of
injured patients to prevail in professional negligence cases.4 This failure is
due to the need for an expert witness, 5 the difficulties involved in proving
negligence,6 and the hesitancy of juries to attach the negligence label to a
physician.7 If it can be shown that strict liability should apply to physicians,
then a strong case can be made that strict liability should apply to other pro-
fessionals, such as lawyers and architects. This article will emphasize the pure
service situation 8 not the cases involving products, commonly referred to as
sale-service hybrids. 9
A definition of strict liability for application to professionals will be
developed in Section III, but for purposes of economic analysis, strict liabil-
ity will mean: first, that the doctor will be liable more often than under a
negligence cause of action; and second, that the doctor will not be absolutely
liable, that is, not liable for all injuries to the patient."
II. THE ECONOMIES OF APPLYING STRICT LIABILITY TO PROFESSIONALS
Many of the arguments against suing physicians are economic in nature:
doctors will leave the profession" or move to a less risky specialty,' 2 malpractice
what procedures to follow in diagnosing and treating ailments. Moreover, strict
liability seems to promise a savings in administrative costs comparable to that ex-
pected under no-fault automobile insurance plans or under strict products liability.
Note, Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141,
1151-52 (1975) (noting this analysis is superficial and advocating a modified application of tort
principles to medical cases) [hereinafter cited as Comparative Approaches.] See also, Note, Con-
tinuing the Common Law Response to the New Industrial State: The Extension of Enterprise
Liability to Consumer Services, 22 UCLA L. REv. 401, 428-51 (1974); Note, Products and
the Professional: Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 111,
120-32 (1972).
4. J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURy 29 (1975). See also sources cited infra notes 5-7.
5. See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 161-66 (1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
6. O'CONNELL supra note 4, at 29.
7. See Helling v. Carey, 84 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974); Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal.
2d 399, 426 P.2d 525, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1967).
8. A pure service involves only a service, or primarily a service, where there is no material
issue of whether a defective product caused the injury. An example of a pure service is
ophthamology. See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 84 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), where an
ophthalmologist was held liable for failing to test a patient for glaucoma.
9. For a classic example of a sale-service hybrid, see Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J.
585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969), where a beauty parlor was held strictly liable for the damage caused
by a permanent wave it had applied.
10. PROSSn, supra note 5, at 517-25. See infra notes 174-87 and accompanying text.
11. Sepler, Professional Malpractice Litigation Crisis: Danger of Distortion?, 15 FORUM
493, 500 (1980).
12. Id.
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insurance rates will become too high,1 3 and suits will raise the costs of medical
treatment beyond the reach -of the poor." It is likely that these arguments
will be raised to counter the application of strict liability to physicians. The
purpose of this section is to discover whether economic analysis will shed light
upon the question of whether strict liability should apply to physicians.
A. Comparing the Application of Strict Liability to Professionals with a
Tax on Automobile Sales
In evaluating the economic impact of applying strict liability to physicians,
it will be helpful to examine a model: a legislatively imposed tax on automobile
sales. This model will suggest that if strict liability is applied to only one doc-
tor, he will have to bear the cost himself. If strict liability is applied to all
physicians, however, the patients, the doctor, and other specialized medical
employees will share the cost. Finally, the model will reflect that if the physi-
cian can control the supply of doctors, he will be able to pass the entire cost
through to the patients.
1. Tax With a Fixed Supply
Assume that there are seven cars and that a buyer is willing to spend $500
for a car. Assume further that the demand and supply schedules are fixed.' 5
FIGURE 1
$200 TAX
D2N
ILl
CARS
13. Id. at 502.
14. Id. at 501. See also, Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspective,
1976 INS. L.J. 90-97.
15. This hypothetical, as well as the accompanying graph, is adapted from A. AiciHIA &
W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL 88 (2d
ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as ALCHIAN & ALLEN].
------- N -
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At this point, the legislature imposes a tax of $200 on the sale of a car.
Because supply is fixed at seven cars and a buyer is only willing to spend
$500, the entire tax falls upon the seller. 6 He keeps $300, and sends $200
to the state. As Professor Alchian states, "The upper demand curve is a
smoothed version of the demand by consumers and the lower demand curve,
exactly $200 lower, is the net of tax demand that sellers retain after the govern-
ment tax."' 7 The tax does not alter the price paid by the car buyers, instead,
it reduces the portion retained by the seller by $200.11 This result, of course,
is dictated by the assumption that supply and demand were fixed. If the seller
tried to raise his price to $700, fewer cars would be sold and the unsold cars
will then be bid down in price back to the old $500 per car. 9 The import
of this for doctors is that if the supply of physicians is fixed and the demand
for medical treatment is fixed, then the application of strict liability to medical
malpractice will mean that the cost of that liability will be borne entirely by
the doctor.
One important point should be noted, however. If the $200 tax on cars
was used to improve highways to the extent of $200, then car purchasers might
be willing to pay more than $500 for the cars because of the additional value
of the improved roads.2" Similarly, if we assume that strict liability results
in the patient receiving more from the physician (compensation for iatrogenic2'
injuries), then the doctor will be able to increase his fees to some extent, and
the patients will pay more because of the increased value received. 22
2. Tax on All Producers in an Industry
To further approximate the real world, it will now be helpful to look at
a model of the entire automobile industry. As with the previous model, the
legislature imposes a tax of $200 on the sale of automobiles. This tax in-
creases each car dealer's marginal costs by $200, and it adds $200 to the average
cost of each car.2 3 If we add together the new higher marginal-cost curves
16. Id. at 89.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 90.
20. See id. at 91.
21. "Iatrogenic" is defined as referring to "any condition in patient occurring as the result
of treatment by a physician or surgeon." DoRAwD's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DIcrsoNARiY (24th
ed. 1965).
22. In the auto example, if the taxes were burned (not used for something of value to the
car buyer), people would not be willing to pay more than $500 for a car. If, on the other hand,
some of the taxes were put into road improvement, people would pay more than $500 for a
car because they received more in return (better roads). If all of the $200 tax was put into roads,
people might be willing to pay more that $700 ($500 + $200) because they valued the new roads
more than $200. Application of this theory to doctors suggests that they may be able to increase
their fees more than the cost of added insurance (to cover strict liability), if the value of the
potential strict liability recovery to the patient is greater than the cost of the insurance to the
physician.
23. See ALcHiAN & ALLEN, supra note 15, at 278-79.
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of all the dealers in the country, we obtain a higher-cost supply curve.24 Before
the tax, the price of a car was $500. Each dealer, now operating on a higher
marginal-cost curve, would reduce its supply at the old price from X1 to
X2.25 The reduced total supply of cars would push up price, which would
induce each dealer to restrain its supply reduction to X3 . 26 The supply curve
for the automobile industry shifts upward to reflect taxes of $200 per car."
This forces the price up to $600.28 Professor Alchian notes:
Part of tax is revealed as a higher price to [sic] consumer and a smaller
rate of consumption; another part is reflected in reduced wealth value
of resources specialized in production of this taxed good. Tax is borne
by consumers and by owners of capital goods and labor services special-
ized to this industry.
29
The point is that the entire tax is not borne by consumers of the automobiles.
Part of the tax is borne by consumers in the form of higher prices and fewer
cars. The other part is borne by the owners of the resources specialized to
automobile production.3 0 Applying this to physicians, the increased expense
of strict liability will increase the marginal costs for each physician. Assum-
ing that all medical doctors are subject to strict liability over time, the price
of medical treatment will rise and fewer services will be available. The costs
of strict liability will be shared by patients, doctors, and those who provide
resources and labor services specialized to medical treatment.
3 1
24. Id.
25. Id. We have dropped here the assumption in the previous example that supply and de-
mand curves are fixed.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. "Price rises by less than tax because, at smaller output, marginal and average costs are
lower." Id. at 277.
"[E]ven if every supplier is affected, price will not rise as much as the cost because (1) the
demand schedule is negatively sloped-less will be sold when price is raised; and (2) the supply
schedule is positively sloped." Id. at 281.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Recent studies by economists endorse the results flowing from strict liability. Professor
Shavell, for example, concludes:
Under strict liability, the outcome is efficient .... [Blecause sellers have to pay
for accident losses, they will decide to take appropriate care and will sell the prod-
uct at a price reflecting accident losses. Thus customers will face the socially cor-
rect price and will purchase the correct amount.
Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1980). See also A.M. Polinsky
& W.P. Rogerson, Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power (May 1982)
(working paper available from Emory University Law & Economics Center); Brown, Toward
an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Spence, Consumer Mispercep-
tions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977). Economists
are also beginning to recognize that strict liability has beneficial effects in situations, such as
medicine, where the patient may fail to appreciate the risks, regardless of whether the producer
faces a competitive market or an oligopoly:
Suppose consumers underestimate the accident probability and producers have no
market power. Then the rule of strict liability leads to the first-best outcome. By
forcing producers to internalize all accident costs, this rule leads them to choose
the correct accident probability; it also leads them to raise their prices to reflect
[Vol. 59:25
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FIGURE 232
ONE AUTOMOBILE
DEALER
AUTOMOBILE
OUTPUT
ALL AUTOMOBILE
DEALERS
ii \D
D
AFTER A ,BEFORE
TAX TAX
3. Tax on One Car Dealer Only
Assume that in the previous example the tax is applied to only one
automobile dealer. The market supply for all car dealers (the industry) would
not shift substantially, because there is no tax on the other dealers. 3 The
car dealer who receives the tax has no way to "recoup part of his wealth
by a higher price." '34 If he attempted to raise his price, purchasers would go
to other dealers.3 5
Applying this to physicians, the first new doctors who are forced to pay
under strict liability will bear the entire loss themselves. But, as more doctors
are subject to strict liability, they will raise their prices and thus cover part
of their losses. Indeed, as noted above, if the patient received substantial
benefits through strict liability, the doctor could completely cover the increased
expense.36 That is, the patient would be willing to pay more for the medical
the cost of achieving this probability and the cost of bearing the remaining damages,
so that the appropriate output is demanded. The rule of negligence is less desirable
because it leads to a larger output. . . . Now suppose market power increases,
say due to an oligopoly situation. Strict liability will still lead to the first-best acci-
dent probability . ...
A.M. Polinsky & W.P. Rogerson, supra, at 2, 3. See also Shavell, supra, at 1.
32. The graph is adapted from ALcmnN & ALLEN, supra note 15, at 279.
33. Id. at 281.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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service because he received more.
There is one sure method for the car dealer to pass the tax to the con-
sumer: "If you could exclude competitors (whose supply in the market makes
your selling price lower), you could raise your price." '37 An example in the
medical context would be limiting the number of competitors by controlling
the size of medical schools, 38 which is arguably one function of the American
Medical Association.
4. A Caveat: Elasticity of the Physicians' Demand Curve
The concept of elasticity indicates how responsive the quantity demanded
is to a change in price. 39 If the demand for medical services is very elastic,
a small increase in physicians' prices will lead to a substantial loss of physi-
cians' total revenue. 0 On the other hand, if the demand schedule for these
services is inelastic, then a small increase in price will lead to a corresponding
small loss in total revenue.4 1 The following two graphs illustrate the two ex-
tremes of the elasticity concept: perfect inelasticity and infinite elasticity.
FIGURES 3 & 4
PERFECT INFINITE
INELASTICITY ELASTICITY
$ D S $
QUANTITY QUANTITY
The impact of an increase in the price of medical services, brought on by
the adoption of strict liability, will depend upon the elasticity of the demand
curve facing the physician. Professor Alchian cautions, however: "Elasticities
of demand with respect to prices are extremely difficult to estimate."4 2 Never-
theless, he suggests that the elasticity of demand for physicians is less than
37. Aicmu & ALLEN, supra note 15, at 281.
38. Reder, Medical Malpractice: An Economist's View, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
511, 559.
39. AIcHiAN & ALLEN, supra note 15, at 59.
40. See P.A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcs 358 (1 1th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SAMUELSON).
41. Id. at 360.
42. ALCHiAN & ALLEN, supra note 15, at 63 (noting that "the total change in amount bought
will not be the result only of a change in price along a fixed demand"). Variables other than
price may have shifted the demand curve itself.
[Vol. 59:25
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one."3 This means, for example, that if the elasticity for physicians was eight
tenths, then a one percent rise in price would decrease the demand for physi-
cians' services by .8%.1" In response, the medical profession might argue that
since medical care is a "necessity," 5 the amount demanded will not change
much with an increase in price. The error is this argument can be shown by
considering an example of another alleged "necessity"-water:
Although people cannot live without it, they will reduce (not eliminate)
their use of water at a higher price .... People in arid regions use less
water, but not because they couldn't use more; rather, they don't want
more at its high price. They choose to consume less water and to use the
money not spent on more water for other, more desired purposes. 46
Similarly, at some high price, people will elect to consume fewer medical serv-
ices, even though the most urgent are commonly regarded as necessities. 47
Moreover, the elasticity for physicians' services may vary with the specialty.
For example, neurosurgeons and emergency room physicians may face inelastic
demand curves. It is unlikely that many people would make a decision not
to visit an emergency room or have neurosurgery performed based on a small
percentage increase in price. In contrast, plastic surgeons and general practi-
tioners may face a rather elastic demand schedule. A slightly higher price may
encourage a patient to endure minor pain or a slight scar, for example.
B. Choices Facing Physicians
The application of strict liability to medical doctors will mean that they
will be paying more in damages or in insurance premiums than under a
negligence cause of action. There are several choices open to the physician
in response to the increased cost brought on by strict liability. These responses
were foreshadowed by the alleged medical malpractice crisis in 1977.48
An initial response by some physicians will be that, if they are going to
be held strictly liable, they will quit the practice or shift to a less risky specialty.
Some will no doubt state that they would rather sing country music, wait
tables, or go sailing than be subject to strict liability. Others may go on strike
as a means of protest. 49 On the other hand, many doctors will likely work
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Professor Alchian addresses this argument when he comments that .'[n]eed' is a word
often used to suggest absolute minimum requirements, when in fact the amount 'needed' depends
on the cost of having more." ALcHAN & ALLEN, supra note 15, at 74.
46. Id. at 64. The uses of water which would be reduced or eliminated as the price increased
would be such non-essential activities as washing cars and houses.
47. For example, as the price of medical services increases, such uses as cosmetic surgery
and visits for preventive treatment (flu shots, routine checkups, etc.) will most likely be reduced.
48. See Meisel & Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent
Legislation, 41 Prrr. L. Rav. 407, 409-17 (1980); Sepler, supra note 11.
49. See Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitu-
tional Implications, 55 TExAs L. REv. 759, 760 (1977).
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within the American Medical Association in order to lobby for the legislative
overturn of strict liability.
50
The vast majority of physicians will remain in practice and devise means
to shift the increased costs to the patients, however. The most obvious method
for accomplishing this is to increase fees. A related approach is for the physi-
cian to purchase sufficient insurance to cover strict liability and add the cost
to his fee. The increase may not be substantial. One study indicates that medical
malpractice insurance costs one dollar and fifty cents per patient visit.5 ' Finally,
the physician could require the patient to purchase insurance covering strict
liability, as a condition precedent to treatment. Insurance companies, for ex-
ample, could devise methods for selling insurance to patients much as they
sell it to the parents of school children.2 Insurance kiosks similar to the ones
in airports might appear in hospitals or in medical complexes.
The prediction of physician strikes, shifts to less risky specialities and mass
resignations may indeed be inaccurate. After all, it is doubtful that many pa-
tients inquire about the fee before obtaining medical services, or if they do
ask, that they make their decision based on an increased cost of several
dollars. 3 Since most patients would not consider a small amount determinative,
it is unlikely that the application of strict liability will cause a substantial
decrease in the demand for medical services. Therefore, few doctors will
seriously consider resigning, moving to a less risky (and less rewarding)
specialty, or striking because of the economic impact of strict liability.
C. Efficiency Considerations
One of the leading authors in.the field of law and economics, Judge Posner,
presents a thesis that "the dominant function of the fault system is to generate
rules of liability that . . . will bring about ... the efficient-the cost-justified-
level of accidents and safety."15 4 He suggests that the appropriate statement
of the relationship between law and economics is contained in Judge Learned
Hand's early formulation of the negligence standard:
[Tihe judge (or jury) should attempt to measure three things: the magnitude
of the loss if an accident occurs; the probability of the accident's occur-
ring; and the burden of taking precautions that would avert it. If the prod-
uct of the first two terms exceeds the burden of precaution, the failure
to take these precautions is negligence. Hand was adumbrating ...an
50. For a discussion of the A.M.A.'s proposed Model Informed Consent Statute, see Meisel
& Kabnick, supra note 48, at 559-61.
51. Comparative Approaches, supra note 3, at 1156 n.78. High risk specialties would likely
have higher rates than general practitioners, however.
52. For example, Pilot Life Insurance Co. offers comprehensive accident insurance to parents
of grade school children for $8.00 per year.
53. Assume, for example, that the cost of strict liability is double the cost of existing malpractice
insurance. That would still only amount to $3.00 per visit. See Comparative Approaches, supra
note 3, at 1156 n.78.
54. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
[Vol. 55:25
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economic meaning of negligence. Discounting (multiplying) the cost of
an accident if it occurs by the probability of occurrence yields a measure
of the economic benefit to be anticipated from incurring the costs necessary
to prevent the accident. The cost of prevention is what Hand meant by
the burden of taking precautions against the accident. . . . If the cost
of safety measures or of curtailment-whichever cost is lower-exceeds
the benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society
would be better off, in economic terms, to forego accident prevention."
Posner's reason for endorsing the Hand negligence formula is to increase
overall economic value or welfare. "
In a recent article, Judge Posner severely criticizes the theory of strict liability
for failing to maximize the joint value of the interfering activities, and argues
again that the Hand formulation of negligence leads to the most efficient
results. 5" Posner's thesis touches upon fundamental theories of negligence,
strict liability, and economics. It therefore deserves more attention, particularly
as applied to medical malpractice.
To prove his point, Judge Posner uses "the now familiar example of the
railroad engine that emits sparks which damage crops along the railroad's
right of way. ' 58 He concludes that:
The value-maximizing solution may turn out to involve changes by both
parties in their present behavior; for example, the railroad may have to
install a good but not perfect spark arrester and the farmer may have
to leave an unplanted buffer space between the railroad right of way and
his tilled fields. Or, the value-maximizing solution may involve changes
by the railroad only, by the farmer only, or by neither party. 9
The invalidity of Posner's criticism of strict liability, as applied to medical
malpractice cases, flows from several important considerations. First, in most
medical malpractice cases the patient can do nothing to prevent the injury.
For example, where a doctor ties an artery rather than a Fallopian tube, or
an oral surgeon severs a nerve, or the wrong drug is prescribed, the patient
can do nothing to avoid the injury. Posner argues that negligence is superior
to strict liability, because it encourages the injured party to take preventive
measures.6" In the sparking train example, the farmer may be in the best posi-
tion to take preventative action. For example, the farmer could plant a
nonflammable crop beside the tracks or leave a buffer zone unplanted. 6' There
are few medical situations, however, where the patient can avoid the iatrogenic
injury.
In contrast, the doctor is usually in the best position to prevent the injury.
He can, for example, select another procedure, prescribe a different drug,
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 206.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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or exercise more care during surgery. Moreover, the American Medical Associa-
tion is in an excellent position to fund injury-prevention research.(" The con-
clusion that a doctor should be held strictly liable for iatrogenic injuries follows
from Professor Calabresi's strict liability test: "which of the parties to the
accident is in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between acci-
dent costs and accident avoidance costs ... *"63 In medical malpractice,
because of the technical material and his superior education, the doctor is
in the best position to make the cost-benefit evaluation. The patient retains
the authority to approve of the risk, the procedure, or the drug, of course.6"
Second, the railroad example upon which Judge Posner bases his theory
is inapplicable tQ medical cases. The relationship between doctor and patient
is one of trust and confidence, a fiduciary relationship." The doctor has an
obligation to inform the patient of all material risks. 6 Posner may be able
to suggest that the railroad should be permitted to cause substantial damage
to the landowner, without liability, for efficiency reasons. 6 This is invalid
as applied to the physician, however. Because of the fiduciary relationship,
the doctor must avoid substantial damage to the patient. Certainly, there is
no suggestion, in medical malpractice precedent, that a doctor should be able
to inflict injury upon a patient for efficiency reasons. 68 If injury to the pa-
tient is to be anticipated, a different course of action must be selected, or
the patient warned. 69
Third, the physician is in the best position to administer insurance. In
Judge Posner's example of the sparking train, he assumes that either the
railroad or the farmer could, with equal ease, purchase insurance.7" In con-
trast, the doctor, because of wealth, experience, and ability to foresee the
hazards involved, is best able to purchase insurance. Often the patient will
be extremely anxious, unconscious, or poor. Because of this, it makes little
sense to suggest that ife patient has the responsibility to purchase insurance
or to negotiate with the doctor over whether or not the doctor will be liable
for iatrogenic injuries.7' The doctor, however, may either purchase insurance,
62. Sef gnerall' Reder, Medical Malpractice: An Economist's View, 1976 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 511, 544-45.
63. Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055,
1060 (1970) (emphasis added).
64. Scholendorf v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
65. Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aff'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151,
530 P.2d 334 (1975).
66. Id.
67. Posner, supra note 57.
68. In an emergency, however, a physician may select either of two available courses of ac-
tion when both will lead to injury. PRossER, supra note 5, at 168-69.
69. Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wastr. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974), aff'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151,
530 P.2d 334 (1975).
70. Posner, supra note 57.
71. Contra, Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 87.
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or require the patient to purchase it as a condition precedent to treatment. 72
When strict liability is adopted, the insurance expense will likely become a
normal part of the patient's bill.
Fourth, the physician has reasons for not warning of risks or discussing a
more expensive treatment. 7 But if he did, the patient would become aware
of the dangers and might not purchase the treatment or surgery. In this unique
type of marketing situation, Judge Posner argues in favor of strict liability:
If a product hazard is small, or perhaps great but for some reason not
widely known. . . consumers may not be aware of it. In these circumstances
a seller may be reluctant to advertise a safety improvement, because the
advertisement will contain an implicit representation that the product is
hazardous. . . . But make the producer liable for the consequences of
a hazardous product, and no question of advertising safety improvements
to consumers will arise. He will adopt cost-justified precautions not to
divert sales from competitors but to minimize liability to injured
consumers. 4
Therefore, if the physician is held strictly liable, but able to avoid liability
by means of accurate warnings, he will likely warn the patient of the risks.
Fifth, the problem of setting the monetary value for benefits and burdens
of medical injuries suggests that the cost-benefit discussion may be more
philosophical than economic. That is, it may be possible to set a price for
an acre of hay or a train's spark arrester, 7 but it is much more difficult to
evaluate the birth of an unwanted child,76 death due to an inappropriate drug, 77
or the suffering caused by a failure to diagnose cancer. Because these costs
are so hard to monetize, the opposition to strict liability may in fact rest on
values.
7
1
In summary, strict liability has substantial economic advantages over the
Posner-Hand formula in the medical malpractice setting. Strict liability will
shift losses from the patient to the doctor and encourage the doctor to spread
those losses through insurance. The economic impact is reduced when losses
are spread, rather than visited upon one person, the patient. 79 As an alter-
native, the physician may require the patient to purchase insurance. In response
to strict liability, the doctor or the A.M.A. will engage in research to develop
72. The doctor may also self-insure, if he believes he is particularly careful.
73. Contra, Miller, 11 Wash. App. at 286, 522 P.2d at 862 ("There is no room for
paternalism.").
74. Posner, supra note 57, at 211.
75. Id.
76. "When the parents say their child should not have been born, they make it impossible
for a court to measure their damages in being the mother and father of a defective child." Gleit-
man v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 29-30, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (N.J. 1967).
77. See Stevens v. Parke-Davis, 9 Cal. 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973) (extensive
overpromotion of chloromycetin).
78. See Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 191 (1980).
79. G. CAI.ABREsi, Tin CosT OF Accm rrs: A LEGAL AND EcONOMc ANA.ysis 39 (1970). But
see R. PosNERa, TORT LAW, CASES AND EcONowc ANALYsIs 517 (1982) [hereinafter cited as POSNER,
TORT LAW] ("[E]ven if everyone experiences diminishing marginal utility of income.., it does
not follow that taking a dollar from a rich man and giving it to a poor man will increase total
utility . . ").
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safer procedures, methods of treatment, or drugs. Finally, in order to avoid
strict liability the physician will likely provide more adequate warnings of risks.
This analysis suggests that an exception exists to the Posner-Hand formula:
the strict liability rule should apply when the injured party was helpless to
prevent the injury. This reasoning has been followed in cases involving ultra-
hazardous activities. For several hundred years, strict liability has applied in
blasting cases, where the neighboring landowner was helpless to avoid the
damage. 80 Strict liability has also been applied in many products liability cases
where the consumer is helpless to avoid the effects of the defective product.8' In-
deed, the law expressly recognizes this helplessness. If the product consumer
is not helpless and can prevent the injury but fails to, then the defenses of
misuse or assumption of risk apply.82 Judge Posner recognizes such an excep-
tion for the helpless plaintiff: "strict liability ... would produce an efficient
solution where that solution was . . . for the railroad alone to take precau-
tions .... -83 Therefore, since a patient in the medical malpractice setting
is usually helpless to prevent damage, the strict liability rule should apply
to medical malpractice as well.
D. Who Pays for Medical Malpractice Injuries?
Thus far it has. been assumed that whenever a patient suffered injury because
of medical malpractice, he bore the loss himself, unless he could recover in
negligence from the doctor. That is, the need for strict liability was predicated,
in part, on preventing great losses from falling upon innocent patients. If
patients usually carried insurance and therefore rarely shouldered a substan-
tial portion of the loss, then the need for strict liability would be weakened.
Examination is appropriate, therefore, to determine how much of medical
malpractice damages are presently borne by the patient.
It is assumed here that malpractice damages are borne by consumers in
the same ratio as consumers bear the cost of physicians' services. Over one
third of the amount spent for physicians' services ($17.4 billion) is paid directly
by consumers. 4 Slightly less than two-thirds of the amount is paid by third
80. See Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969); PROS-
SER, supra note 5, at 513-14. But see Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d
645 (1954) (creating an exception to the imposition of liability where the plaintiff's use of his
own land could be characterized as unusual or extraordinary).
81. See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke-Davis, 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973)
(extensive over promotion of chloromycetin); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960) (purchaser's wife injured when car suddenly veered off the road and into a wall).
82. "The seller is entitled to have his due warnings and instructions followed; and when they
are disregarded, and injury results, he is not liable." PROSSER, supra note 5, at 669.
83. Posner, supra note 57, at 207.
84. Figures for 1980 indicate that 37.31% of physicians' services were paid for directly by
consumers. Gibson & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1980, 3 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv.
40 (1981).
In contrast, only 9.1% of the amount spent for hosiital care was paid directly by consumers
in 1980. The remaining 90.9% was paid by various third party payment sources. Id. at 39.
[Vol. 59:25
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
parties,8" a mixture of private and public sources.16 Since the cost, of physi-
cians' services will fall directly on a substantial number of consurfers," 7 and
those who pay from their own pockets are likely to be the poor, the
unemployed, and the unsophisticated,8 8 it is appropriate that the loss due to
malpractice be borne by the person who caused it rather than the innocent
patient. To be sure, the absence of insurance on the part of the plaintiff will
become a more telling factor in favor of strict liability when the application
of strict liability to attorneys and architects is considered, since very few per-
sons who suffer malpractice damages from these two professions will have
appropriate insurance coverage. However, even in an area of professional
malpractice where many consumers do carry insurance, such as medical
malpractice, the coverage will often be inadequate to compensate fully the
injury sustained."
Several conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the economics of
applying strict liability to professionals. First, it is not clear that physicians'
fees will rise substantially or that large numbers of doctors will be motivated
to strike for long periods if strict liability is applied. Second, hard data is
needed on whether health care workers will bear the expense of strict liability
or whether it will be passed on to patients. Third, although some recent
economic studies strongly support the application of strict liability to
professionals, 90 traditional economics does not answer the question of whether
strict liability should9 apply to professionals.
85. Sixty-two and seven tenths percent of physicians services were paid for by third parties
in 1980. Id. at 40.
86. Private insurance sources paid 36.3% of the cost of physicians' services; public programs
paid 26.1% of that cost. Id.
87. This assumes that there is a correlation between the amount spent on physicians' services(and paid for directly by the consumer), and the number of people who pay directly for physi-
cians' services.
88. In evaluating who will carry insurance, Professor Franklin concluded:
The argument can always be made that those who wish protection against such
risks can do so by purchasing insurance for medical expenses and income loss.
Even with the increased use of such insurance in the United States today, however,
the very poor are unlikely to have any, much less adequate, protection. Strict liability
is thus a much more reliable method for spreading this type of loss. Thus if it
is conceded that every person who suffers substantial harm should, receive some
financial assistance, strict liability could be justified solely because it always defuses
the cost of such assistance . ...
Franklin, supra note 3, at 464.
89. For example, Professor Franklin, in discussing the liability of blood banks for transmit-
ting hepatitis, states:
For some policyholders, general first-party medical and income protection policies
would help, should hepatitis strike. But even if such policies provided full coverage
without limits or deductibles, they would still not cover pain and suffering.
Id. at 469.
90. See A.M. Polinsky & W.P. Rogerson, supra note 31; Shavell, supra note 31.
91. "Economic theory provides no basis, in general for preferring strict liability to negligence,
or negligence to strict liability, provided that some version of a contributory negligence defense
is recognized." Posner, supra note 57, at 221.
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The application of strict liability to professionals raises two challenging legal
questions: what is meant by strict liability, and how do you draw a line be-
tween injuries for which a plaintiff will be able to recover and those for which
no recovery will be permitted. This section will consider these problems and
apply strict liability to cases involving professionals. Detailed discussions of
the policy reasons for applying strict liability to physicians may be found
elsewhere.92
A. What is Strict Liability?
This section will examine a highly controversial question: the definition of
strict liability. It will evaluate several tests for strict liability, consider a func-
92. Professor Marc Franklin, in discussing the liability of physicians for injuries resulting
from hepatitis, stated:
Few attempts have been made to hold physicians strictly liable in any context.
Since strict liability for defective products has been limited to those in the prod-
uct's chain of distribution, rather than persons using the product in supplying ser-
vices, attempts to apply this doctrine to physicians have thus far proved fruitless.
. . . The safety incentive rationale is compelling, . . . since physicians are usually
seeking profit in a competitive context. Imposing hepatitis costs on surgeons would
emphasize the risks of blood transfusions, and the surgeons could respond by pressur-
ing local hospitals to alter their source of blood or pressuring the blood banks
to provide improved service. This latter approach would be particularly effective,
since several are run by local medical societies. The most likely response, however,
would be analogous to the resource allocation response that we discussed for banks
and hospitals: Surgeons would give fewer transfusions and increase their use of
component therapy. Finally, the loss-spreading justification applies to physicians
since they are well aware of the risks involved and are able to insure against them.
The risk of hepatitis would probably not raise the premiums for malpractice in-
surance appreciably, and the physician could pass these additional costs on to his
patients through higher fees.
Franklin, supra note 3, at 472. See also Comparative Approaches, supra note 3.
Judge Tobriner, concurring in Clark v. Gibbons, stated:
A system openly imposing liability without any pretense of negligence in this nar-
row range of cases can avoid unwarranted imputations of fault while permitting
the rational development of badly needed doctrine. Simultaneously, such a system
can insure that the burdens of unexplained accidents will not fall primarily upon
the helpless but will be borne instead by those best able to spread their cost among
all who benefit from the surgical operations in which these misfortunes occur.
426 P.2d 525, 539, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 139 (1976) (Tobriner, J., concurring).
In a suit against a dentist, the dissent stated:
Moreover, the strict liability rule does not discourage prudence but may actually
encourage examination for defects which are not obvious.
The law of torts should seek to compensate the injuries, to encourage safety
practices and to distribute losses justly .... Dentistry as an enterprise should pay
its own way. Denying compensation is to require an injured person who bears the
loss alone to subsidize the risk-creating activities by which others profit.
For the foregoing reasons strict liability in tort should apply to a dentist who
injures his patient by a latently defective instrument.
Magine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super 223, 235, 240-41, 241 A.2d 637, 644, 646-47, aff'd, 53 N.J.
259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
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tional test for strict liability, and conclude with a caveat from Judge Posner.
In deriving a strict liability test for application to professionals, it will be
helpful to examine strict liability as applied to defectively designed products
and abnormally dangerous activities, such as blasting. Most of the commen-
tary and judicial writing dealing with strict liability, has concerned these two
areas.
1. Strict Liability in Products Liability
The keystone policy underlying strict liability was stated in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors: "[Tihe burden of losses consequent upon use of defec-
tive articles is borne by those who are in a position to either control the danger
or make an equitable distribution of the losses when they do occur." 9 3 At
least seven tests have been suggested for evaluating a defective product such
as the one involved in Henningsen: first, the section 402A "unreasonably
dangerous" test;94 second, the risk-benefit test;95 third, the California test;96
93. 32 N.J. 358, 359, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960).
94. Restatement section 402A provides that "[one who sells any product in a defective con-
dition, unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer .... " RESTATEMENT (SEC-
oND) oF TORTs § 402A (1965). The greatest difficulty in the interpretation of this definition has
risen from the term "unreasonably dangerous." There are several grounds for criticism of the
"unreasonably dangerous" language. It is argued that the usage misleads the jury by suggesting
that it is not enough that the defective product be dangerous. It is also argued that use of language
relating to reasonableness implies that the defendant must have been negligent. Proponents of
the Restatement formulation respond that "unreasonably dangerous" means the same thing as
"defective" and adds no additional elements to the proof required of the plaintiff. Difficulty
in reconciling these opposing interpretations of the language is compounded by the fact that
there is no precedent for the use or interpretation of the term "unreasonably dangerous." Van-
dall, "Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 Omo
ST. L.J. 61, 72 (1982).
95. The risk-benefit test assures that strict liability does not result in the manufacturer being
an insurer of a product, by providing that danger and utility must be weighed in evaluating
a design hazard. Dean Keeton, the leading proponent of the risk-benefit rest, states:
A product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous as marketed. It is unreasonably
dangerous if a responsible person would conclude that the magnitude of the scien-
tifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the time of the trial outweighed
the benefits of the way the product was so designed and marketed.
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 37-38 (1973).
Factors in measuring risk include likelihood of harm, potential seriousness of the harm, and
the nature of the danger. Factors in measuring benefit include need for the product, feasibility
of a safer design, and availability of substitute products.
The use of the term "unreasonably dangerous" 'here, as in the Restatement test, supra note
94, creates problems by implying a negligence standard and a need for the plaintiff to prove
more than defectiveness. The language is thus misleading to that extent, even though the focus
on balancing risk and benefit is otherwise valid. Vandall, supra note 94, at 74.
96. The two-prong test for defect developed by the California Supreme Court has been stated
as follows:
[A] product may be found defective in design, so as to subject a manufacturer
to strict liability for resulting injuries, under either of two alternative tests. First,
a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the prod-
uct failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used
in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. Second, a product may alter-
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fourth, negligence with imputed knowledge; 97 fifth, the communicative tort;98
natively be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the prod-
uct's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish, in
light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
Barker v. Lull's Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
237-38 (1978). This definition grew largely out of a concern that the term "unreasonably dangerous"
puts an unfair burden on the injured plaintiff of proving something like negligence. It also reflects
the ratipnale that defectiveness of design cannot be determined without some balancing of com-
peting factors.
Despite the attempt to improve the definition by eliminating the term "unreasonably dangerous,"
the California test has potential problems of its own. First, Dean Wade has criticized the con-
sumer expectation standard by noting that often "the consumer would not know what to expect,
because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made." Wade, On the Nature
of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829 (1973). A second and even more
serious problem is the use of the term "proximate cause." The term adds no clarity to the defini-
tion, and is superfluous in that determinations of defect and proximate cause involve basically
identical questions of policy. It is confusing and misleading to ask the same policy questions
twice, once in determining proximate cause and once in assessing defect. Vandall, supra note
94, at.75.
97. This test, as developed by the Oregon Supreme Court, involves a modification of the
traditional negligence approach. The test has been stated as follows:
A dangerously defective article would be one which a reasonable person would
not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its harmful character.
The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the article
knowing of the risk involved. Strict liability imposes what amounts to constructive
knowledge of the condition of the product.
Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) (emphasis in
original). Both Professor Wade and Professor Keeton accept this test, but they disagree as to
its relationship to negligence. Professor Wade argues that it is essentially a negligence test. Pro-
fessor Keeton counters that "[s]ince the test is not one of negligence, it is not based upon the
risks and dangers that the makers should have, in the exercise of ordinary care, known about."
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect in the Manufacture and Design of
Products, 20 SYRAcusE L. REv. 559, 568 (1969). The Oregon court's assessment of these two
views is that they "appear to be identical except that Keeton would impute the knowledge of
dangers to the manufacturer at time of trial, while Wade would impute only the knowledge
existing at the time the product was sold." Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492
n.6, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 n.6 (1974).
The use of the term "negligent" in the definition thus creates an obvious difficulty in the
interpretation and application of this test. Courts have consistently held that strict liability is
not a matter of negligence. Also, the usage adds nothing that was not already available to and
in use by courts, which had found constructive knowledge of defects where circumstantial evidence
was strong enough to permit such an inference. By including an apparent requirement that the
plaintiff prove negligence, this test runs contrary to the established cases as well as the fund-
amental theory of strict liability. Vandall, supra note 94, at 76.
98. The communicative tort action, as proposed by Dean Leon Green, is one "based on the
duty to inform or to give reliable information, set off distinctly from the ... negligence action
based on the duty of care." Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade
of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1185, 1188 (1976). The basic theory is that a seller will be held
liable if the defective product injures a consumer due to absence of warnings or adequate in-
structions. The seller's liability is justified on the basis of the "corporate seller's command of
all the media of communications to support his aggressive campaigns." Id. at 1190.
The adequacy of the information provided by the seller is clearly a critical factor in products
liability, and Dean Green's proposal is important insofar as it encourages courts to consider
this factor. The language of the proposed tort is so different, however, from the familiar language
of products liability that it seems unlikely to gain wide acceptance by courts. Also, such an
action based on information given by the seller to the purchaser would probably not be ap-
propriate in a case brought by a donee or bystander. There are some cases, however, in which
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sixth, the cheapest cost avoider; 99 and seventh, the causation test."'0
2. Strict Liability in Abnormally Dangerous Activities
The concept of strict liability in defective products is similar to strict liability
in abnormally dangerous activities, such as blasting.101 Strict liability in ab-
normally dangerous activities is primarily a question of social policy: who
should bear the loss?"0 2 That is, "the justification for strict liability . . . is
that useful but dangerous activities must pay their own way."103
the adequacy of warnings or instructions is the critical concern, and in which an action in the
nature of Green's communicative tort would be most appropriate. Vandall, supra note 94, at 77.
99. The concept of the cheapest cost avoider comes from Professor Guido Caabresi's work
in applying economic analysis to products liability. Calabresi examined the traditional Learned
Hand cost-benefit test and determined that it "tends to make injurers richer at the expense of
victims." Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 63, at 1077. In arguing for a different test, Calabresi
notes that strict liability developed not merely to distribute risk, but also "at least in part...
to accomplish better primary accident cost reduction." Id. at 1075.
This accident cost reduction, as proposed by Professor Calabresi, can be achieved through
a novel approach:
The strict liability test we suggest does not require that a government institution
make such a cost-benefit analysis. It requires of such an institution only a decision
as to which of the parties to the accident is in the best position to make the cost-
benefit analysis between costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that deci-
sion once it is made. The question for the court reduces to a search for the cheapest
cost avoider.
Id. at 1060 (emphasis in original). An example of this is that "a violinist is the best evaluator
of the relative advantages and costs of working in a steel mill, with regard to the suffering he
will feel if he loses his hand ....... Id. at 1069.
The Calabresi cheapest cost avoider test is unlikely to be widely adopted since it relies upon
non-judicial terminology. In effect the test would often approach strict liability, since most prod-
ucts liability suits involve a relatively unsophisticated consumer against a seller knowledgeable
of his product, and the seller will in all such cases be the cheapest cost avoider. In any event,
the Calabresi test is valuable for its application of economic principles to the imposition of liability
for injury from defective products. Vandall, supra note 94, at 78.
100. Professor Richard Epstein states that "that concept of causation, as it applies to cases
of physical injury, can be analyzed in a matter [sic] that both renders it internally coherent and
relevant to the ultimate question who shall bear the loss." Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 173 (1973). In analyzing causation he rejects the traditional two-part,
cause in fact and proximate cause, format. His causation test is expressed as "proof of the prop-
osition A hit B should be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of liability .... The choice
is plaintiff or defendant, and the analysis of causation is the tool which, prima facie, fastens
responsibility upon the defendant." Id. at 168-69.
Professor Epstein's theory has two major problems. First, he defines so many traditional torts
concepts in new ways that is is unlikely to be widely followed. Second, the total focus on causa-
tion, like earlier attempts to use foreseeability as a catchall concept, may well overload the term
to the point that it loses usefulness. Vandall, supra note 94, at 79.
101. See Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11,250 N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527, on remand,
33 A.D.2d 516, 304 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1969). The Spano court uses the term "absolute liability,"
but since the defense of assumption of risk would be available, "strict liability" is a more ac-
curate term. See W. PROSSER, J. WVADE & V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS 15 (6th ed. 1976).
'102. "The question ... was not whether it was lawful or proper to engage in blasting but
who should bear the cost of any resulting damage-the person who engaged in the dangerous
activity or the innocent neighbor injured thereby." 25 N.Y.2d at 17, 250 N.E.2d at 34, 302
N.Y.S.2d at 532 (emphasis in original).
103. Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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3. A Functional Test for Strict Liability
Analysis of a test developed for the application of strict liability to defec-
tively designed products manifests that it is a statement of the important policies
that should be weighed by the judge in deciding whether a product seller should
be held strictly liable. The social policies indicated in the test prove to be
more important than the fact that the seller has marketed a product as op-
posed to providing a service:
The court's test for whether the product is defective involves a balancing
of operative factors. First, the court must consider that the reasons for
strict liability are to shift the loss from the consumer to the seller and
that the loss should be borne by the person who created it. Second, the
court should weigh: (1) the product's utility, including style or aesthetic
appeal; (2) the alternative designs; (3) the substitute products; (4) the
likelihood of injury; (5) the nature of the injury; (6) the cost of making
the product safer; (7) the availability and effectiveness of warnings; (8)
the ability of the seller to obtain insurance or otherwise carry the loss;
(9) the impact upon society of finding the product defective; (10) the ex-
perimental nature of the product. This is not an exclusive list, and the
court may consider other factors that it deems relevant.'0 4
With modifications, this test for defective products can be used in dealing
with professionals. Such a test, appropriate for applying strict liability to pro-
fessionals, is developed in a later section.' 5
4. Caveat: An Economist's Critique of Strict Liability
Judge Posner has developed a theory of strict liability. Because it is a
challenge to traditional notions of strict liability, it must be examined closely.
Posner's concept of strict liability is simple to state: "If the expected loss
from some type of accident is great, and the -loss cannot be reasonably averted
by taking greater care but can be by an adjustment in the activity level, an
economic case for strict liability is made out."' 6 Several points should be
noted in regard to Posner's concept of strict liability. First, Posner's defini-
tion of strict liability is contrary to the cases. In the classic strict liability
case, blasting, the goal of the courts is not to adjust the level of activity,
but just the opposite. Blasting is highly valuable to society and to be
encouraged.'0 7 The goal of strict liability is not to reduce the level of activity;
it is to spread the inevitable losses.' 0 Second, there is no reason for con-
cluding that strict liability will lead to a change in the level of activity. In-
104. Vandall, supra note 94, at 83.
105. See infra notes 174-248 and accompanying text.
106. POSNER, TORT LAW, supra note 79, at 477, 511. Judge Posner may be referring to Shavell's
theory concerning unilateral activities. Shavell, supra note 31.
107. See Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 17, 250 N.E.2d 31, 34, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527,
532 (1969); Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931).
108. 25 N.Y.2d at 17, 250 N.E.2d at 34, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
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deed, all that flows from a strict liability action is damages. This is also what
results from a negligence action. To be sure, the defendant in a negligence
action may decide to reduce his level of activity, as may the defendant who
is held strictly liable. The calculation of damage is based on the losses the
plaintiff has suffered, 109 not whether the defendant was sued in strict liability
or negligence. Indeed, there is some feeling that damage verdicts in strict liabili-
ty cases might be lower than in negligence cases." 0
In support of his definition of strict liability, Judge Posner challenges the
traditional rationale for strict liability, loss spreading, on three grounds. First,
"there is an element of conjecture involved in supposing that taking a con-
centrated loss off the back of a victim of some accident and dividing it up
into many small losses to customers or shareholders will increase total
utility."" Professor Calabresi takes the contrary position and states that the
party "in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident
costs and accident avoidance costs .. .12 should bear the loss. In this way
the defendant will soon adjust his conduct." 3 Also, Calabresi notes that plac-
ing the entire loss on one person is not economically beneficial."'
Second, Posner argues that "there is an alternative . . . method of loss
spreading available to potential victims besides strict liability: they can buy
insurance . . . . ."IS Professor Calabresi suggests that this is invalid to the
extent that there is little deterrence value in placing the loss on the victims.6
They rarely have the ability to make changes in the conduct that is causing
the injury.
Third, Posner states: "IT]here is no presumption that changing the poten-
tial injurer's activity level is the economically most efficient method of inter-
nalizing some external cost . . . . -."" This reduction in the activity level is
apparently Judge Posner's personal thesis as it is not supported by other
economists, or the cases." 8 In addition, the Hand theory" 9 advocated by Judge
109. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 143-44.
110. "In MeLuenesque terms negligence is 'hot' and strict liability is 'cold.' It is easier to
prevail by showing that the defendant did something wrong than that there is something technically
defective about the product." Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A
Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 521, 531 (1974).
111. POSNmR, TORT LAw, supra note 79, at 517. Posner defends his position by noting that
while for any given individual the marginal utility of each dollar of income decreases as income
rises, the marginal utility functions for individuals differ. Thus he hypothesizes that a given dollar
may in fact have more utility to some rich individual than to a poor individual, so that total
utility would not be increased by shifting the loss of that dollar from the poor man to the rich man.
112. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 63, at 1060, 1076-84 (further discussing the relation-
ship of their test to distributional goals such as loss spreading).
113. CALABREsi, supra note 79, at 68-94.
114. Id. at 39-45.
115. POSNER, TORT LAW, supra note 79, at 517-18.
116. CALABREsi, supra note 79, at 55.
117. See POSNER, TORT LAW, supra note 79, at 518 (emphasis added).
118. See Cities Service v. Florida, 312 So. 2d 799 (D.C. 1975); Spano v. Perini, 25 N.Y.2d
11, 250 N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969).
119. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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Posner places the loss upon those who are often the weakest members of
society, 2" and is unlikely to lead to any decrease in the costs of accidents.'2 1
B. The Compensable Event
A major issue in applying strict liability to professionals is how to draw
the line between injuries for which the claimant will be able to recover in
strict liability and other injuries. A line must be drawn at some point, because
strict liability theory does not intend, in dealing with professionals or product
manufacturers, for the defendant to be held liable for all injuries he causes.' 22
Clearly, strict liability is not absolute liability.'23 Several commentators have
suggested that there is no feasible method to draw such a line when consider-
ing professionals. 2 ' However, while marking the outer limits of strict liabil-
ity will be challenging, examination will manifest that doing so is similar in
function to the negligence concepts of proximate cause and duty,' 5 which
also deal with cutting off liability at some point.
This section will evaluate several approaches for determining a compen-
sable event, that is, when the claimant can recover from a professional in
strict liability. It will conclude with a proposed alternative to these approaches.
1. Proximate Cause and Duty
Proximate cause is the term used for resolving the scope of liability issue
under the negligence cause of action.'26 Several tests have been used to han-
dle this complex question of where to draw the line in negligence cases:
foreseeability;' 27 remoteness;' 2" natural cause; 29 direct cause; 3" the foreseeable
120. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 63, at 1076-84.
121. Id.
122. Justice Traynor's suggestion for imposition of absolute liability in Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944), has not been followed by courts.
See Vandall, supra note 94, at 78-79.
123. Vandall, supra note 94, at 79.
124. See Comparative Approaches, supra note 3, at 1153.
125. See PROSSER, supra note 5, at 517. Prosser notes various formulations of the scope of
strict liability, concluding that "ordinarily . . . the limitation is one of the policy underlying
liability." Id.
126. Prosser notes, in discussing proximate cause, that
[a]s a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which
are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law isjustified in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the conse-
quences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.
PROSSER, supra note 5, at 236-37.
127. See Oversears Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Mort Dock & Eng'g Co. (Wagon Mound No.
I), [1961] A.C. 388. The court there stated that "if it is asked why a man should be responsible
for the natural or necessary or probable consequences of his act . . . the answer is that it is
not because they are natural or necessary or probable, but because, since they have this quality
. . . he ought to have foreseen them." Id. at 390.
128. See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1968).
129. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Daniels, 8 Ga. App. 775, 779, 70 S.E. 203, 205 (1911).
130. See In re Arbitration Between Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.).
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small risk;"' and the foreseeable plaintiff. 32 All suffer from vagueness and
serve to conceal the true social policies that motivate the judge to decide that
liability should end at a particular point. 33 Because of these shortcomings,
it fosters clear analysis to use the duty approach in negligence cases rather
than proximate cause.' 34
Dean Leon Green has pioneered an analytical approach to the scope of
liability issue that rests on the duty concept and eliminates the issue of prox-
imate cause.' 35 In weighing that issue, he urges the courts to consider several
factors: flood of litigation, administrative impracticality, no limitation on
liability, immorality, hardship, injustice, ability to carry the risk, changed social
conditions, economics, and prevention.' 36 The duty approach avoids "squid
function" words such as foreseeability 37 and directs the court to consider
the important and operative social policies.
Green's approach has real merit in that it points us to the policies that
should be considered in deciding where to draw the line on liability. There
are several problems, however, in applying the duty approach to strict liabil-
ity and professionals. First, it fails to indicate that cases dealing with abnor-
mally dangerous activities and products liability have held that the primary
reason for strict liability is loss spreading.1 3 Second, the duty approach was
developed over fifty years ago to clarify the negligence question, and fails
to reflect recent judicial developments in strict liability.'39
2. Cheapest Cost Avoider
Professor Calabresi's test for strict liability should also be considered for
determining the compensable event. He suggests that strict liability be im-
posed on whichever "of the parties to the accident is in the best possible posi-
tion to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident
avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made."' ' I Several reasons
suggest the application of this test to medical doctors:
131. See Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. (Wagon Mound II), [1967]
1 A.C. 617.
132. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
133. Dean Green notes that courts are "exceedingly timid in discussing the policies which lie
at the base of liability based upon negligent conduct. Instead, they lower the curtain of 'prox-
imate cause' and seldom disclose the policies at the base of their decisions." Green, Proximate
Cause in Texas Negligence Law (pt. 4), 28 TEx. L. Ray. 755, 758 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Green].
134. Green argues that the judge should determine the defendant's duty to the plaintiff, con-
sidering "the policies which enter into the allocation of risks such as may be involved in the
particular case." Id. at 773-74. See also Vandall, supra note 94, at 67-68.
135. Green, supra note 133, at 773.
136. Id. at 757 n.4; Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (pt. 1), 28 COLUM. L.
REv. 1014, 1034-44 (1928).
137. See Green, supra note 133.
138. See Vandall, supra note 94, at 63-64.
139. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1944); Green-
man v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963);
Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1974); McCormack v. Hankscraft
Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
140. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 63, at 1060.
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Implicit in the test is the notion that strict liability should place fault
wherever a marked differential in ability to perform the cost-benefit analysis
relevant to the maloccurrence is evident between identifiable categories
of parties. . . . Presumably health care providers, as a category, have
more information or better access to information than their patients and
are therefore in a better position to perform the cost-benefit analysis as
to what procedures to follow in diagnosing and treating ailments. Moreover,
strict liability seems to promise a savings in administrative costs comparable
to that expected under no-fault automobile insurance plans or under strict
products liability.'
The "cheapest cost avoider" test has several serious drawbacks, however.
When applied to doctors, the result is absolute liability, because in most medical
cases, the doctor possesses superior knowledge. In application then, there is
no basis for drawing the line between two close cases.'42 Because the "cheapest
cost avoider" approach leads to absolute liability, there may be a substantial
increase in insurance costs and related administrative expenses.' 43 Finally, the
author of the test has never endorsed its application to professionals.'" In-
deed, he appears to prefer a type of workers' compensation in this area.'4
3. New Zealand's Medical Misadventure
A possible test for the compensable event under strict liability is New
Zealand's approach to medically related injuries. In 1972, New Zealand
abolished tort claims for personal injury damages and other "categorized
systems of compensation."' 4 6 This was replaced with a system of social
insurance.'47 The main features of the system are straightforward.' As describ-
141.. Comparative Approaches, supra note 3, at 1152.
142. "According to its originators, this test would be applied to broad categories, and not
to individuals on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 1151-52.
143. Id. at 1154-55.
144. Calabresi, The Problem of Malpractice: Trying to Round out the Circle, 27 U. TORONTO
L.J. 131 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Calabresi, The Problem of Malpractice]. Calabresi here discusses
the problems of compensation for injuries due to medical malpractice, but without ever recom-
mending, indeed hardly mentioning, the cheapest cost avoider approach.
145. Calabresi states that he considers "the most promising attempt at reform ... that tried
by Havighurst & Tancredi." Id. at 137. The Approach is described in Havighurst & Tancredi,
Medical Adversity Insurance-A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance,
613 INs. L.J. 69, 71 (1974), in which the authors note that the proposed scheme is "roughly
analogous to the workmen's compensation system for handling industrial accidents." Calabresi
notes that the Havighurst & Tancredi Scheme would not cover all situations, Calabresi, The
Problem of Malpractice, supra note 144 at 137, 140, and states that it does not provide "enough
of an answer." He does not, however, advance any alternative scheme as preferable.
146. T. ISON, ACcIDENT COMPENSATION 13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as IsoN].
147. Id.
148.
Stated over-simply, the main features of the system are as follows. A statutory
body, the ACC, is the administering agency and adjudicating tribunal. The main
revenues of the system are derived in three ways and recorded in three funds.
1. Levies on employers and the self-employed are collected by the Inland Revenue
(a collecting agent for the ACC), and paid into an "earners' fund." The rate of
levy payable in respect of employees ranges from 50 cents to $5.00 per $100.00
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ed by Terence G. Ison, "[Tihe system generally covers all cases of 'personal
injury by accident' without inquiry into fault, without inquiry into cause, and
for the most part, without other qualifying requirements that would delay
or complicate the payment of benefits.' 4 9 The Accident Compensation Act
states that "personal injury by accident" includes "[Miedical, surgical, den-
tal, or first aid misadventure."" 0
Medical misadventure is defined as follows:
(a) a person suffers bodily or mental injury or damage in the course
of, and as part of, the administering to that person of medical aid, care
or attention, and
(b) such injury or damage is caused by mischance or accident, unex-
pected and undesigned, in the nature of medical error or medical mishap.'
The compensable event for strict liability could track the New Zealand plan
by adopting the test for a medical misadventure and stating that the compen-
sable event is broader than negligence, in that it includes medical mishaps
and medical errors. There are several problems with relying on the New Zealand
approach too heavily, however. First, in New Zealand the term medical
misadventure "clearly excludes the normal risks of operative or other medical
procedures."' 152 Second, because the scope of coverage is not precisely de-
fined, there is an "uncertainty about the extent to which tort claims are
abolished."' 53 Third, in New Zealand, "medical misadventure" covers most,
but not all, negligence, and therefore doctors still carry liability insurance."',
Fourth, tough cases involving an absence of diagnosis, a wrong diagnosis,
or adverse consequences from proper treatment have created substantial dif-
ficulties in New Zealand." 5' For example, coverage has been rejected for cases
involving post-operative infection. 56 Coverage will likely be rejected in New
Zealand for treatment that "does not improve the patient's condition...
or where the change results from . . . bodily reaction, or other
complication."" 7 These problems suggest that the New Zealand approach is
inadequate for defining the compensable event for strict liability.
of payroll (as of 1 April 1979), depending on the risk classification of the employ-
ment. For the self-employed there is a standard rate of $I.00 per $100.00 of earnings.
2. Levies on motor vehicles are collected by the Post Office (a collecting agent
for the ACC) as part of the motor vehicle license fee. These levies are paid into
a "motor vehicle fund." The rate of levy for an ordinary motor car is $14.20 per
annum, with other rates applying to other types of motor vehicles.
3. A "supplementary fund" is created from general government revenues to pro-
vide benefits in respect of injuries not covered by either of the other two funds,
for example, housewives injured at home.
Id. at 14.
149. Id. at 18.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 36.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. G. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INcAPAcrrY 256 (1979).
156. Id. at 257.
157. Id. at 258.
1983]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
4. Consumer's Reasonable Expectations
Professor Greenfield suggests that a service should be considered defective
"if it fails to meet the reasonable expectations of the consumer."' 58 He reasons:
[Jiust as the purchaser of goods reasonably expects them to perform in
such a way as to accomplish the purpose for which they were manufac-
tured and for which he purchases them, so the purchaser of services ex-
pects those services to be performed in such a way as to accomplish the
purpose for which he purchases them. The consumer's reasonable expec-
tations as to quality are the same for services as for goods."'
He qualifies this by stating: "In service transactions... it is not always possible
to attain the consumer's goal, and when this is so, an expectation of perfec-
tion is not reasonable." '1 60
The "consumer's reasonable expectations" test contains a fatal flaw; many
professional-service transactions, particularly those of doctors, lawyers, and
architects, are too technical and specialized for consumers to form reasonable
expectations. In the products area, Dean Wade stated that the expectations
of the ordinary consumer cannot be used as a standard for evaluating design
defectiveness because "in many situations. . the consumer would not know
what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could
be made."' 6' This reasoning applies, a fortiori, to technical professional serv-
ices and suggests that it is unlikely that the consumer's reasonable expecta-
tions test will be helpful in determining the compensable event.
5. Inouye-Kennedy No-Fault Bill
In 1975, Senators Inouye and Kennedy proposed strict liability for medical
injuries in Senate Bill 215.162 The bill provided for no-fault compensation "for
loss from any injury suffered as a result of health care services provided by
an insured to [any] beneficiary .... 163 An injury was defined to mean
"physical harm, bodily impairment, disfigurement, or delay in recovery.I1 6"
A patient could either claim against the doctor in strict liability or sue in
negligence before a state court.' 6' The compensable event was defined as
follows:
[An injury "results" from the provision of health care services when it
is more probably associated in whole or in part with the provision of such
services than with the condition for which such services were provided.
158. Greenfield, supra note 3, at 697.
159. Id. at 698.
160. Id.
161. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829 (1973).
162. S. 215, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 681 (1975).
163. Id. § 1711(a).
164. Id. § 1721(7).
165. Id. § 1717.
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• . . "[H]ealth care services" means the rendering, as well as the omis-
sion, of any care, treatment, or services .... 166
This proposed bill does answer the critics who argue that no test can be
devised for the compensable event." 67 There are two major problems with using
this particular test, however. First, the phrase "more probably associated
... with the provision of such services" is extremely vague and will only be
answered through case by case administration or litigation." 8 Second, such
extensive litigation may consume the savings brought about through strict
liability."69
6. A Functional Test for Determining the Compensable Event
Analysis of various tests for the compensable event manifests that they are
too broad,' 0 too narrow,' 7' or clearly inappropriate.7 2 A test is needed that
combines generality and specificity, while indicating appropriate factors for
consideration. The test must be capable of fine tuning. Modifications to the
design-defect test noted earlier' 73 produce a functional test that accomplishes
these goals. The purpose of the functional test is to set forth the factors that
have been identified by the courts as important in deciding two related ques-
tions: first, should strict liability apply to these facts; second, if strict liability
applies, should this defendant be held liable?
The test for the court in deciding whether a professional should be held
strictly liable involves a balancing of operative factors. First, the court must
consider that the reasons for strict liability are to shift the loss from the in-
jured person to the professional and that the loss should be borne by the
person who created it.' 71 Second, the court should weigh: (1) the social utility
of the service performed by the professional, including whether it was trivial
or necessary; 7s (2) the modified procedures that could have been used to ac-
166. Id. § 1721(8), (11).
167. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 3, at 697-98; Comparative Approaches, supra note 3,
at 1153-54.
168. See Comparative Approaches, supra note 3, at 1159.
169. Savings would probably result, however, if special hearing officers developed expertise
in making determinations using the test. Id.
170. See discussions of proximate cause, supra notes 126-39 and accompanying text; cheapest
cost avoider test, supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text; New Zealand's social insurance
system, supra notes 146-57 and accompanying text; and the Inouye-Kennedy proposals, supra
notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Calabresi's criticisms of the Havighurst/Tancredi scheme, supra note 145.
172. For discussion of the "consumer's reasonable expectations" test, see sources cited supra
notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
173. See sources cited supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
174. This rationale was stated in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), and in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
150 P.2d 436 (1944).
175. For example, was the doctor performing neurosurgery to remove a malignant tumor or
was he removing a mole for cosmetic reasons?
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complish the same result;' 76 (3) possible substitute services; 77 (4) the likelihood
of injury; 78 (5) the nature of the injury;' 9 (6) the cost of making the service
less risky;"' ° (7) the value and opportunity of providing the patient or client
with a warning of the risks;' 8 ' (8) the ability of the professional to obtain
insurance or otherwise carry the loss;"82 (9) the impact upon society of find-
ing the professional strictly liable for this service;' 8 (10) the experimental nature
of the service; 84 (11) the amount of judgment required of the professional
in making the decision;'"5 and (12) the time available to make the decision.'"
176. Could, for example, a less risky drug have been prescribed? Could the technique or surgery
have been less invasive?
177. Could rest and diet have accomplished the same result as surgery? Could the attorney
have settled the case without going to trial?
178. Should the physician have anticipated a substantial chance of adverse results? Should
the attorney have been able to anticipate that he might lose the case?
179. Is the resultant injury trivial, substantial, or very serious?
180. Could the service have been made substantially less risky by a small expenditure of time
or money?
181. Was the patient very young or in an emergency situation so that a warning would be
inappropriate? Could the patient or client comprehend the warning?
182. In medical malpractice cases, the doctor will usually have insurance. Sometimeg, however,
the patient will have insurance. In malpractice cases involving attorneys, however, it is unlikely
that the client will have insurance that covers the injury. In malpractice cases involving architects,
an uninsured third party often will be injured. In contrast, insurance is readily available to ar-
chitects. Note, Architect Tort Liability in Preparation of Plans and Specifications, 55 CAL. L.
RaV. 1386 (1967). In Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 520, 519 P.2d 981, 985 (1974), the
concurring judge argued that strict liability "serves a compensatory function in situations where
the defendant is, through the use of insurance, the financially more responsible person."
183. Is this service so vital to society that any real and prolonged decrease in its availability
would adversely affect society as a whole? In this vein, there is evidence that the medical malpractice
crisis never existed. See generally, Sepler, Professional Malpractice Litigation Crises: Danger or
Distortion, 15 FORUM 493 (1980).
184. Was this an important experiment that should receive the encouragement and support
of society? See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k. Was the patient fully
informed of the risks of the experiment? See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
185. One commentary suggests that the "routine" or "standardized" nature of the service
is the key to applying strict liability to a lawyer. Five factors are presented for evaluating when
an attorney's service is "standardized":
(1) [t]he assessment of attorneys' fees; (2) the delegation of lawyers' tasks to lay
assistants; (3) the use of systems analysis in the performance of legal services; (4)
the use of automation and computer technology by lawyers; and (5) the encroach-
ment of lay persons and lay institutions upon areas of work [formerly] performed
by lawyers.
Mallor, Liability Without Fault for Professional Services; Toward a New Standard of Profes-
sional Accountability, 9 SETON HALL L. REV. 474, 493-94 (1978).
This is an important distinction between products liability and services. In the services context,
if the decision is technical or routine and the results of each alternative are clear, then strict
liability would be appropriate. But if the decision involves substantial amounts of discretion
or judgment, then negligence is the better cause of action. This principle was applied in Helling
v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 518, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974), where the court rejected the standard
of the medical profession and held the doctor liable. One factor the court placed weight on
was that the decision whether to give a glaucoma test to persons under 40 years of age involved
no judgment. 83 Wash. 2d at 518, 519 P.2d at 983. Similarly, Johnson v. Sears, 355 F. Supp.
1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973), held that strict liability applied to the "mechanical and administrative
services" of the defendant hospital.
186. Professionals often find themselves confronted with an emergency. There is little time
for reflection and a decision must be made. When a professional is confronted with an emer-
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This is not an exclusive list and the court may consider other factors that
it deems relevant.
The proposed test states that priority should be given to the primary reason
for strict liability: loss shifting.'8 7 No priority is given to the twelve secondary
factors, because the weight given to each will vary with the facts of the par-
ticular case. The policies that are important to holding a professional liable
are expressly stated in the test.
C. Application of the Functional Test to Decided Cases
Several cases have in fact considered the application of strict liability to
professionals. This section will apply the functional test to the reported cases
gency, negligence is the preferred cause of action.
In most products cases, however, the manufacturer has time to evaluate the various courses
of action. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); Evans v.
General Motors, 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
187. See Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981, 984-85 (1974) (" strict liability
serves a compensatory function in situations where the defendant through the use of insurance,
is the financially more responsible person").
In regard to jury instructions, the best approach is to charge the jury with the same test for
strict liability that was employed by the court in deciding whether there was sufficient evidence
of strict liability to send the question to the jury. The "jury should be charged to weigh the
appropriateness of loss shifting, as well as the other important factors."Vandall, supra note
94, at 85.
The following statement, made in regard to products, seems valid here also:
In reply to those who argue that the jury is too unsophisticated to evaluate such
complex issues as loss shifting, substitutability of other products, and prevention
of injury, it must be remembered that the products liability jury likely has gone
through weeks or months of expert testimony on such complex questions as modifica-
tion costs, alternativeness of the product, and sales problems. The jury should be
charged to weigh what they have heard during the trial which is, in large part,
social policy. To do other than this is to force the attorneys to emphasize concepts,
such as proximate cause, foreseeability, and remoteness, that may mislead the jury.
Id. at 85-86.
On the other hand, in dealing with products liability, several charges have been suggested and
may be considered for professional-service cases. See generally id. at 84-86. One suggested ap-
proach is to submit the factors enumerated by Dean Wade to the jury, instructing them specifically
to weigh those factors in their decision as to whether the product was defective. Critics of this
approach argue that our relatively unsophisticated juries are poorly equipped to handle such
complex and subtle considerations. A second approach is thus to simply ask the jury directly
"was the product defective?" Both these approaches raise the issue of whether the court should
give the jury some definition of defect, or simply ask for a determination of whether the product
was defective without further definition. The California court resolved this issue by including
a definition in the jury charge. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443,
455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38 (1978). See supra note 96.
The California test has several problems as a jury instruction. The consumer expectation language
in the first prong of the test could mislead a jury into denying liability merely because a con-
sumer had no particular knowledge or expectations of the product. A second problem is the
term "foreseeable" which, according to Dean Green, is a "red herring" which distracts the jury's
attention from the real social policy questions which should in fact be addressed. See generally
Green, supra notes 133 & 137. The major problem with the second prong of the California test
as a jury instruction is the term "proximate cause," a term troublesome for lawyers, much more
so for lay jurors. Besides the basically definitional problems just noted, the California test also
fails to give the jury any indication of the historical rationale for strict liability, i.e., shifting
loss to a seller of a product. Vandall, supra note 94, at 84-85.
1983]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
dealing with the medical profession, architects, and attorneys. The purpose
is to manifest that the functional test is workable and produces appropriate
results.
1. Physicians: Cases Involving a Service
Only three reported cases have dealt with a strict liability suit against a
physician for injuries from a service where no product was involved. In Hell-
ing v. Carey, ' the plaintiff developed glaucoma because the defendant, an
ophthalmologist, failed to test for it. The doctor, however, was following
the professional standard for ophthamologists: the glaucoma test was usually
not given to persons under forty years of age. The court expressly rejected
the standard of the medical profession and found the ophthalmologist
negligent. The court reasoned that the test was simple, inexpensive, and
harmless; thus it should have been given.' 9 The court also emphasized that
there was "no judgment factor involved" on the part of the doctor. 9"
In applying the functional test for strict liability to Helling, the simple,
inexpensive and harmless nature of the glaucoma test, as well as the ministerial
nature of the decision, argue that strict liability should apply. Indeed, the
concurring opinion in Helling suggested that the case rested on strict liability:
The difficulty of this [negligence] approach is that we as judges ... seem
to be imposing a stigma of moral blame upon the doctors who ... used
all the precautions commonly prescribed by their profession .... Lacking
their training in this highly sophisticated profession, it seems illogical for
this court to say they failed to exercise a reasonable standard of care.
It seems to me we are, in reality, imposing liability, because, in choosing
between an innocent plaintiff and doctor ... the plaintiff should not
have to bear the risk of the loss. As such, imposition of liability approaches
that of strict liability. 191
The concurring opinion emphasized the role of insurance: "strict liability serves
a compensatory function in situations where the defendant is, through use
of insurance, the financially more responsible person."' 92
Hoven v. Kelble'93 involved a suit against a surgeon, an anesthesiologist,
the hospital, and the insurance carrier. The patient suffered cardiac arrest
while undergoing a lung biopsy. After considering the policies for and against
strict liability, the court rejected it, because "the consequences of the step
the plaintiffs urge cannot be predicted with sufficient clarity.'"" The court
permitted a count in res ipsa loquitur, however.
Unfortunately, there is insufficient information presented in Hoven to decide
188. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
189. Id. at 518, 519 P.2d at 983.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 520, 519 P.2d at 984.
192. Id. at 521, 519 P.2d at 985.
193. 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977).
194. 79 Wis. 2d at 472, 256 N.W.2d at 393.
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whether, under the functional test, strict liability was appropriate. For exam-
ple, the following questions need to be answered before the test can be ade-
quately applied: could the procedure have been modified; were other services
available; what was the likelihood of the injury and the cost of making the
service less risky; was there an opportunity to provide the patient with a warn-
ing; how much judgment was involved in the decision; and was there an
emergency? The Hoven case simply did not present enough factual informa-
tion to adequately address these questions.
Clark v. Gibbons'95 presents the most clearly stated judicial discussion of
the application of strict liability to professionals. In Clark, the patient suf-
fered injury from premature termination of a fracture reduction. The spinal
anesthesia wore off before the surgery was completed. The patient sued the
anesthesiologist and the orthopedic surgeon. The majority applied res ipsa,
but Judge Tobriner, in a concurring opinion, argued for the application of
strict liability:
A system openly imposing liability without any pretense of negligence
... can avoid unwarranted imputations of fault while permitting the ra-
tional development of badly needed doctrine. Simultaneously, such a system
can insure that the burdens of unexplained accidents will not fall primar-
ily upon the helpless but will be borne instead by those best able to spread
their cost among all who benefit from the surgical operations in which
those misfortunes occur.196
Judge Tobriner added that strict liability will encourage settlements" 7 and
avoid the destruction of reputations that flows from a finding of negligence.'
He concluded that:
[B]asic error lies in primary reliance upon the concept of negligence and
... the courts should undertake a fundamental re-assessment of the largely
fictitious and often futile search for fault which presently characterizes
medical injury litigation . . . . 99
Under the functional test for strict liability, the doctors would be liable
in Clark. Several different procedures could have been used by the
anesthesiologist,"' there was substantial likelihood of injury if the anesthetic
wore off, 10' the cost of extending the duration of the anesthetic was small,202
the doctors failed to communicate with each other and therefore failed to
exercise the judgment they possessed, 20 3 and there was no emergency.20 '
195. 426 P.2d 525, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1967).
196. 426 P.2d at 539, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (Tobriner, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 540, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 140 (Tobriner, J., concurring).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 538, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (Tobriner, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 528-29, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29. Other anesthetics or other modes of administra-
tion could have been used.
201. Id. at 529, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 528-29, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29.
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Together these factors tip the balance in favor of holding the physicians in
Clark strictly liable.
2. Physicians: Cases Involving a Service and Product
Several of the many important cases dealing with strict liability and a pro-
fessional service have also involved a product. The functional test suggests
that the celebrated case of Magrine v. Krasnica2° 5 was wrongly decided. In
Magrine a patient sued a dentist for damages suffered when a hypodermic
needle broke off in the patient's jaw.2 0 6 On appeal, the New Jersey Superior
Court affirmed the Hudson County court's decision in favor of the dentist. 20 7
The court rejected the application of strict liability:
[The dentist] ... neither created the defect nor possessed any better capacity
or expertise to discover or correct it .... Defendant dentist did not put
the needle in the stream of commerce. . . . [Pirofessional services and
skill [are] the essence of the relationship .... 208
Under the proposed functional test, Magrine was wrongly decided because
the dentist was in the best position to spread the loss and to prevent the in-
jury. If his insurance did not presently cover such losses, 20 9 it would in the
future," ' or the dentist could become a self-insurer. His ability to purchase
insurance and spread the loss was the key factor, not that he was a "small
business. ' 21' Also, the dentist was in the best position to prevent the injury.2 I2
He will note the needle's manufacturer,2"3 and select a more reliable manufac-
turer the next time. Indeed, he could have cheaply prevented the breakage
by not using each needle eight times.2 "' The cost of using more needles, in
relation to the potential injury, was low. Another important factor is that
the dentist's decision was ministerial in nature and involved little judgment.
205. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aff'd
sub nom., Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968),
aff'd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 234-35, 227 A.2d at 543 (emphasis in original).
209. The insurance carrier here was denying coverage, apparently on the grounds that the
case involved implied warranty, a contract claim, rather than a covered malpractice claim. Id.
at 239, 227 A.2d at 545.
210. See Franklin, supra note 3, at 439, 472.
211. The refusal of courts to visit large losses upon small businesses has, in part, rested on
the idea that it would put them out of business. Contemporary insurance equalizes the loss spreading
ability of large and small businesses, however. Applying this to professionals, then, the dentist
is just as able to purchase malpractice insurance as the large or small business is able to purchase
product liability insurance.
212. He could have used the needle only once or purchased a better grade of needle (if that
was the problem).
213. The dissent in Magrine v. Spector notes that strict liability "may encourage greater cau-
tion in purchasing equipment and examining for defects." 100 N.J. Super. at 232, 241 A.2d at 642.
214. 94 N.J. Super. at 230, 227 A.2d at 540.
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The choice was merely whether to use a new needle. ' " Finally, the dissent
in Magrine makes a telling point in support of applying strict liability:
Dentistry as an enterprise should pay its own way. Denying compensation
is to require an injured person who bears the loss alone to subsidize the
risk-creating activity by which others profit. 1'6
In Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.2"7 the Superior Court of New Jersey limited
the scope of Magrine when it held that strict liability applied to a beautician
who caused the plaintiff to contract dermatitis by applying a permanent wave
solution to the plaintiff's hair: "the transaction here . . . consisting of the
supplying of a product for use in the administration of a permanent wave
to plaintiff, carried with it an implied warranty that the product used was
reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was to be used." 2 '" On appeal
in Newmark, the New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with a challenging
argument: "there is no doctrinal basis for distinguishing the services rendered
by a beauty parlor operator from those rendered by a dentist or a doctor. ' 2 9
The court rejected the argument:
On the contrary there is a vast difference in the relationships. The beauti-
cian is engaged in a commercial enterprise; the dentist and doctor in a
profession. The former caters publicly not to a need but to a form of
aesthetic convenience or luxury .... The dentist or doctor does not and
cannot advertise for patients .... °
This reasoning has been severely undermined by the recent Supreme Court
decisions that advertising by doctors22 ' and lawyers 2 is commercial speech
and cannot be prohibited. These decisions remove the asserted basis for
distinguishing the beautician in Newmark from the dentist in Magrine, sug-
gesting that the same standard should be applied to both.223
215. Compare the judgment factor with the discretionary functions exception in administrative
law. The discretionary functions exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act protects the official
from suit. The purpose of the exception is to avoid dampening the ardor of the official. K.
DAvis, ADmInsTRATiVE LAW TEXT § 26.01-.02 (1972).
Another decision dealing to some degree with the nature of the judgment required was Johnson
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973). The plaintiff there sued Sears
for injuries resulting from an improperly installed tire. Sears impleaded the defendant hospital.
Although the court held that strict liability applies to the "mechanical and administrative serv-
ices provided by hospitals," id. at 1067, the acts of the hospital were so unclear that the whole
opinion is of doubtful value. The test proposed for applying strict liability to professionals can-
not be used without a clear understanding of the facts of the case.
216. 100 N.J. Super. at 240-41, 241 A.2d at 647.
217. 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (1968), aff'd, 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
218. 102 N.J. Super. at 286, 246 A.2d at 15.
219. 54 N.J. at 596, 258 A.2d at 702.
220. Id.
221. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
222. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
223. In the many other cases where a product and a professional service have been involved,
the courts have generally rejected the application of strict liability. For example, in Batiste v.
American Home Prod. Corp., 32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1977), a doctor was
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3. Architects
There are several policy reasons for applying strict liability to architects.22 '
One is that insurance is readily available to architects, thereby providing a
means of spreading the loss.225 Second, the contract between the client and
the architect is not a sufficient basis for recovery. For example, injured per-
sons who are not the architect's clients will not be able to recover under the
terms of the contract.22 6 Third, clients are unaware of the need for inserting
provisions into contracts that shift the loss to the architect.22 7 Finally, impos-
ing strict liability upon an architect will deter him from designing dangerous
structures."'
Despite these policies favoring strict liability, no reported case has held an
architect strictly liable for the design or construction of a building. One im-
portant case, however, did apply strict liability to an architect who was both
designer and builder. In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,"29 a sixteen month
old child was scalded by boiling-hot water that came out of a sink in a mass-
sued for prescribing an oral contraceptive that caused a stroke. The Uniform Commercial Code's
version of implied warranty was rejected as a theory of liability on the basis that the "essence"
of the transaction was service and not the sale of a good. Id. at 4, 231 S.E.2d at 222. Carmichael
v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971), involved a suit against a physician
for damages from a pulmonary embolism caused by a drug prescribed by the defendant. The
court rejected the application of strict liability in tort, on the basis that when seeking medical
attention, the "dominant purpose is to obtain services." Id. at 978, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 393. Silverhart
v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1971), involved a
strict liability suit against a hospital. During a hysterectomy, a needle broke off and remained
imbedded in plaintiff's lower pelvic area. The California appellate court rejected plaintiffs strict
liability argument, reasoning: "The essence of the relationship between a hospital and its pa-
tients does not relate essentially to any product ... but to the professional services it provides."
Id. at 1027, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91. Strict liability has generally been rejected in cases where
the plaintiff contracted serum hepatitis from the unique product of blood. See Franklin, supra
note 3, at 439. In Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp. 47 Il1. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897
(1970), the court applied strict liability to the hospital that supplied the blood, but the decision
was later superceded by the legislature. See ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 91, §§ 181-184 (1971).
These cases illustrate the hesitancy of the courts to extend strict liability to professionals.
Problems with their reasoning have been discussed elsewhere. See Franklin, supra note 3, at
460-61; Greenfield, supra note 3, at 679-96. Application of the functional test to the large number
of service-product cases is beyond the scope of this article.
224. On the other hand, several reasons are advanced for not applying strict liability to ar-
chitects. First, lawsuits based on strict liability will damage the professional reputation of the
architect. Comment, Architect Tort Liability in Preparation of Plans and Specifications, 55 CAL.
L. REv. 1361, 1388 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Architects Tort Liability]. Second, in almost all
designs, the judgment of the architect is involved and, therefore, errors are inevitable. Id. at
1389. Third, if architects are held strictly liable, without the defense of reasonable care being
available, they will become either too careless or too careful. Id. Fourth, if the architect is held
strictly liable, he will be deluged with false claims. Id.
225. Id. at 1387.
226. Id. at 1386
227. Id.
228. Note, Liability of Design Professionals-The Necessity of Fault, 58 IowA L. REV. 1221
(1973).
229. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
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produced home designed by the architect. 230 The defect was that the sink did
not have a mixing valve which would have lowered the temperature of the
water.23' The court applied both strict liability and negligence to the "mass
developer of houses, who was architect, builder and vendor all in one." '232
The Schipper court reasoned:
We consider that there are no meaningful distinctions between Levitt's
mass production and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of
automobiles and that the pertinent overriding policy considerations are
the same. That being so, the ...strict liability principles . . . should
be carried over into the realty field .... The public interest dictates that
if such injury does result from the defective construction, its costs should
be borne by the responsible developer who created the danger and who
is in the better economic position to bear the loss rather than by the in-
jured party who justifiably relied on the developer's skill . . . . 2
Application of the functional test for strict liability suggests that the Schip-
per decision was correct: mixing valves were readily available," there was
a substantial likelihood of injury, 231 the injury was severe (seventy-four days
in a hospital, two skin graft operations),236 the cost of making the sink safe
was low (between $3.60 and $18.00), warnings were ineffective,238 malprac-
tice insurance was available to architects, 239 there was little judgment involved
in the decision, and there was no emergency. Thus, the functional test sup-
ports the Court's conclusion that the architect should* be strictly liable.
On the other hand, the general rule is that where the architect's function
is solely to design the project, the plaintiff will be required to prove
negligence.20 A few jurisdictions have avoided this rule by finding the ar-
chitect liable for breach of an implied warranty.2" ' However, one court, in
rejecting implied warranty as a cause of action has stated: "An engineer, or
any other so-called professional, does not 'warrant' his service or the tangible
evidence of his skill to be 'merchantable' or 'fit for intended use.' These are
terms uniquely applicable to goods. ' 242 The court continued, "the use of the
term 'implied warranty' in these circumstances merely introduces further con-
fusion into an area of law where confusion abounds. 2 3
230. Id. at 76, 207 A.2d at 317.
231. Id.
232. Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 209, 245 A.2d 1, 4 (1968).
233. 44 N.J. at 91, 207 A.2d at 326.
234. Id. at 78, 207 A.2d at 319.
235. Water temperatures above 190 degrees were necessary for some household purposes such
as house heating, but temperatures above 140 were noted as highly dangerous for direct contact,
i.e., if not mixed with cold water before reaching the faucet. Id. at 79, 207 A.2d at 319.
236. Id. at 76, 207 A.2d at 317.
237. Id. at 78, 207 A.2d at 319.
238. The plaintiff in the case was the 16 month old child of a lessee. Id. at 76, 207 A.2d at 317.
239. Comment, supra note 224, at 1391.
240. Note, supra note 228, at 1235.
241. Id. at 1233.
242. Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply v. Britt, 168 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. Dist. App. 1964).
243. Id.
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4. Attorneys
No case has held that strict liability applies to attorneys. Indeed, no case
has considered the question as a part of its holding. Two cases have noted
the issue, however. One stated, in dicta, that implied warranty may apply
to an attorney.2 '4 Another merely referred to the question.2" Broyles v. Brown
Engineering is the only case that offers specific reasons why an attorney should
not be held strictly liable:
Interpretation of law... cannot be an exact and accurate science. There
is generally no formula to follow. Even when Code forms are used in
the drafting of a complaint, questions often arise as to whether or not
the correct form for the client's case has been used. The courts from state
to state, and among the judges on a particular court, often disagree in
their interpretation as to the effect of judicial pronouncements or legislative
enactments. Trial lawyers are dependent on the reactions of jurors to fac-
tual presentations and the application of law thereto .... [A]s a whole,
lawyers are dealing with factors that are beyond their control and under
such circumstances, common dealings would reasonably suggest the absence
of any implied guaranty of results.24 "
The functional test suggests that some activities of an attorney should be
subject to strict liability, however. This possibility was noted by the Broyles
court:
[A] court might hold that an attorney who is entrusted with drawing a
will and its proper execution impliedly insures its proper execution by suf-
ficient number of witnesses signing their names as such-a very simple
mandate of law that requires no room for divisional interpretation.2 7
The important factors in finding strict liability here would be: the likelihood
of injury if too few witnesses were used, the low cost involved in checking
the statute for the correct number of witnesses, the ability of the attorney
to insure against the risk as compared with the client, the small amount of
judgment involved in the activity, 2 8 and the time available to research the
law. Thus in certain routine matters the factors favoring the imposition of
strict liability may apply to attorneys.
On the other hand, strict liability would not apply to many areas of an
attorney's work. For example, a great deal of judgment is involved in litiga-
tion decisions about who to depose and who to call as witnesses at trial. In
these decisions, strict liability would not be helpful.
244. Broyles v. Brown Eng'g Co., 275 Ala. 35, 39, 151 So. 2d 767, 771 (1963).
245. Hoven v. Koble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 467, 256 N.W.2d 379, 390 (1979).
246. Broyles, 275 Ala. at 39, 151 So. 2d at 771. Further discussion of reasons why an attorney
should not be held strictly liable is found in Mallor, supra note 185, at 475.
247. Broyles, 275 Ala. at 39, 151 So. 2d at 771.
248. The "standardized" nature of the service has been suggested as a key to applying strict
liability to a lawyer. See supra note 191.
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IV. STRICT LIABILITY, CONTRACT, AND NO-FAULT
Professor Epstein suggests that a physician employ contractual provisions
to avoid the application of strict liability:
The important point again is to note that in most cases a medical malprac-
tice suit is an outgrowth of a prior consensual relationship between physi-
cian and patient. Under these circumstances the parties themselves have
strong incentives to allocate the risks of treatment between them in a man-
ner that promotes both the efficient allocation of resources and optimum
distribution of risk.
249
This theory has been rejected by the courts because it fails to recognize the
inherent imbalance in the physician-patient relationship. First, the patient likely
knows little about the medical procedure involved.25 Second, the patient lacks
bargaining power.251 Third, the physician has considerable market power. "
Fourth, the doctor would lack the incentive to draft an individualized con-
tract and would probably resort to forms.25 3 Fifth, the patient would likely
underestimate the risk of the medical procedure. 254 Sixth, Epstein apparently
intends no real "quid pro quo." He appears to favor a contract where the
patient would surrender his or her right to sue for millions of dollars in
damages in return for a slight decrease in the physician's fee. 25 Finally, the
courts have uniformly struck down disclaimers of liability in health care
cases." 6 Because disclaimers in physician-patient contracts violate public
policy, 2S7 it is doubtful that such disclaimers will be effective in limiting strict
liability actions.
249. Epstein, Medical Malpractice• The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 87, 105.
250. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972).
251. Id.
252. See A.M. Polinsky & W.P. Rogerson, supra note 31.
253. Epstein appears to consider general standardized forms as valuable in giving the physi-
cian "necessary discretion." Epstein, supra note 249, at 124.
254. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d at 242-45, 502 P.2d at 9-11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513-15.
255. See Epstein, supra note 249. In fact, Professor Epstein never sets out what the contract
should contain.
256. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33, (1963). See also Porubiansky v. Emory Univ., 156 Ga. App. 602, 275 S.E.2d 163 (1980),
aff'd, 248 Ga. 391 (1981). In Tunkl the court listed the following characteristics of the doctor-
patient relationship which make disclaimers of liability inappropriate:
Thus the ... invalid exemption involves ... the following characteristics. It con-
cerns a business ... thought suitable for public regulation. The party seeking ex-
culpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public,
which is often of practical necessity for some members of the public .... [T]he
party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength.
... [T]he party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract ...
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d at 98-100, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38.
257. Id. at 101, 383 P.2d at 447, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 39. The court in Tunkl notes that in the
typical doctor-patient relationship:
The releasing party does not really acquiesce voluntarily in the contractual shifting
of the risk, nor can we be reasonably certain that he receives an adequate con-
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The real problem with the contract solution to professional liability is that
much would be surrendered (the damage action) in return for very little (a
decrease in the fee). A stronger case for the contract solution might be
presented if the doctor promised to pay for all out-of-pocket expenses arising
from an iatrogenic injury in return for the patient's promise to relinquish
his right to recover in tort.
Analogizing medical malpractice to products liability, Professor Jeffrey
O'Connell has proposed that no-fault insurance be adopted for injuries aris-
ing from medical treatment. According to Professor O'Connell:
The scenario for medical malpractice cases closely follows that for prod-
uct liability. Here, too, one finds (1) liability turning on quite complicated
fact situations, with concomitant expense and delay, (2) deeply offended
defendants whose instinct is to resist settlement strongly, (3) such expenses
and bother of litigation that only the largest claims are brought, (4) rela-
tively little of the total loss being paid from liability insurance, (5) rapidly
rising claims and premiums, and (6) most of the money going to lawyers
and insurance companies rather than to the accident victims.,
As a solution to these problems, Professor O'Connell proposes that a profes-
sional "should be able to elect.. . to pay for injuries he causes on a no-fault
basis, thereby foreclosing claims based on fault or defect." '259 The no-fault
solution would, of course, involve a contract, but a contract much more
generous to the patient than the Epstein contract proposal:
[Playment under elective no-fault liability would be limited to out-of-pocket
losses above any amounts payable from collateral sources such as Blue
Cross and sick leave. Payment would . . . not be made for pain and
suffering. 
2 6
1
The no-fault solution to malpractice has not been widely adopted, 26 ' and
the reason is clear: there is little incentive for a physician to elect no-fault
because he stands an excellent chance of winning most malpractice cases. 262
The strict liability approach proposed in this article would provide an incen-
sideration for the transfer. Since the service is one which each member of the public,
presently or potentially, may find essential to him, he faces, despite his economic
inability to do so, the prospect of a compulsory assumption of the risk of another's
negligence. The public policy of this state has been, in substance, to posit the risk
of negligence upon the actor; in instances in which this policy has been abandoned,
it has generally been to allow or require that the risk shift to another party better
or equally able to bear it, not to shift the risk to the weak bargainer.
258. O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 29.
259. O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising from Medical Treatment: A Proposal
for Elective Coverage, 24 EMORY L.J. 21, 34 (1975) [hereinafter cited as O'Connell, No-Fault
Insurance].
260. Id. at 35.
261. O'Connell points to the New Zealand plan as accomplishing some of the goals of elective
no fault. O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 73. However, he also notes that as of 1978 in the United
States, "no fault reform is stuck. No state has enacted a new law since 1975." O'Connell, Harness-
ing the Liability Lottery: Elective First-Party No-Fault Insurance Financed by Third Party Tort
Claims, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 693, 695.
262. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
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tive for elective no-fault, however. If the doctor failed to offer no-fault to
his patient, he would often be strictly liable if the patient suffered injury.
If he offered no-fault, he could custom tailor the benefits within the bounds
of public policy.2
63
Strict liability has several advantages over elective no-fault, however. First,
strict liability would have a more substantial deterrent effect than no-fault. 264
Second, as noted by Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 265 in most market situa-
tions, strict liability, rather than no-fault, would lead to medical services reflect-
ing the socially correct price. Third, the patient's recovery under no-fault is
substantially less than under strict liability. Fourth, elective no-fault must await
action by the physician, while strict liability is independent of any physician-
patient contract.
CONCLUSION
The genesis for this article was Magrine v. Krasnica,266 where the court
failed to provide convincing reasons for rejecting the application of strict liabil-
ity to a dentist. The case reflected a need to examine the application of strict
liability to professionals from a broader legal perspective, and through in-
sights provided by economics.
Section II demonstrated that traditional economic analysis suggests that a
professional should not be treated differently from a product seller for the
purposes of imposing liability. Indeed, recent economic studies which argue
that strict liability should apply to product sellers suggest that strict liability
is also appropriate for professionals. 267
Section III demonstrated that legal analysis also supports the application
of strict liability to professionals. Tests for dealing with the core question
of where to draw the line are available. Admittedly they are not tidy, but
neither are other familiar tort concepts such as negligence or proximate cause.
Specifically, this Article proposes that courts adopt the functional test. Ap-
plying the functional test for strict liability to decided cases manifests that
the test is workable and will assist the courts in addressing the operative social
263. See the discussion of public policy limitations in Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). See also the approach to incentives for
no-fault in O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance, supra note 259, at 35-37, suggesting that "[iln return
... for electing no-fault liability, an enterprise would pay victims for typical risks created by
that enterprise only amounts above and beyond other payments due from all other sources."
Id. at 35.
264. It seems likely that strict liability would result in more cases being lost by the physician,
with higher damage awards than under no-fault; the desire to avoid these results would lead
t6 greater care on the part of the physician under strict liability.
265. Shavell, supra note 31, at 4; Polinsky & Rogerson, supra note 31, at 1-4.
266. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), aff'd
sub nom., Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd,
53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
267. See Shavell, supra note 31, at 4-6; Polinsky & Rogerson, supra note 31.
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policies. Indeed, the case analysis section of this Article makes clear that strict
liability is equally applicable to physicians, attorneys and architects.
At first blush, the concept of applying strict liability to professionals ap-
pears radical. However, economic theory, legal analysis, historical develop-
ment, and the application of the functional test to decided cases all suggest
that applying strict liability to professionals is a theory deserving serious con-
sideration, particularly since elective no-fault has not been widely adopted
and the United States lacks both national health care insurance and full in-
jury protection (as found in New Zealand).
